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Comments / The Integrated Bar After
Lathrop v. Donohue-Integration or Disintegration?
I. HISTORY AND MECHANICS
OVER ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO the American Jurist stated:
We think that everything relating to the early history and antiquities of the
Inns of Court must be interesting to the profession here. Wherever the common
law is studied and practiced they must be regarded as the original fountain-
heads of the law, towards which the true lawyer must feel as a Jew does towards
Jerusalem and a Mussulman towards Mecca.'
Today, a student of the common law in this country may find that these
"fountainheads of the law" are no longer revered, nay, perceived. Since the
concept of the integrated bar is derived from the Inns of Court it is necessary
to examine briefly this aspect of our common law heritage.
The British Inns of Court are four in number: Lincoln's Inn, Inner Temple,
Middle Temple and Gray's Inn. Each Inn consists of Masters of the Bench
(commonly called Benchers), Barristers and students. Every man (or woman)
who wishes to become a barrister must become a member of one of the Inns;
he may select which one he prefers. The student must keep a certain number
of terms, generally twelve, which usually is done by dining in the hall of the
Inn. This is considered of prime importance as a social method of observing
the principles and standards of honor required in an honorable profession.
Here the student rubs elbows with the elders of the law and receives his legal
training. Examinations are controlled by the Benchers of the four Inns through
I Cited in Fooshee, The English Inns of Court: Their Background and Beginnings, 46
A.B.A.J. 616, 617 (1960). For a more detailed history of the Inns of Court see Hughes, The
British Inns of Court, 1 FED, B. ASSN. J. 52 (1932); COHEN, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING
BAR (1929).
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a joint committee appointed for this purpose. Education and discipline of the
barrister is entirely in the hands of the Inns subject to review by the Supreme
Court.
Early colonial history reveals that the tradition of the Inns of Court did
not flourish in this country. Our lack of heterogeneity, sense of independence
and frontier spirit were not receptive to this method of regulation. As the
nation expanded westward it became increasingly difficult to supervise the
practice of law. It was under these conditions that voluntary bar associations
developed in the various states. The voluntary bar association is a satellite type
of organization not representative of the entire legal profession of the juris-
diction. Membership is not a condition precedent to practice. By 1914 Herbert
Harley, the founder of the American Judicature Society, had noted that the
effectiveness of these voluntary associations corresponded to the extent that
they represented the entire state bar. Mr. Harley began his campaign for bar
integration on the pages of his journal. The society published a model bar act
patterned after the Canadian system of an integrated bar.2 The integrated bar
is the official association of all the members of the bar of the jurisdiction. The
two key words are "all" and "official." 3 It must include all the members of the
bar. Bar integration recognizes the lawyer as an officer of the courts and sets up
by governmental authority an official organization.4 It is official in that it
speaks for the legal profession of the jurisdiction, self-governing and self-dis-
ciplining. It is necessary to observe that a voluntary association cannot become
integrated merely by enlisting all the lawyers of a state, as it would still lack
the power to bind all of its members.
Integration may be accomplished in three ways:
A. Statute-An act of the legislature sets forth in detail the structure and powers
of the organization corresponding in content to the existing bar. This method
is based on the legislative police power.
B. Statute and Court Rule-The legislature enacts a statute in short form, author-
izing the highest court in the state to integrate the bar, leaving to the court
the task of adopting rules providing for the details of organization.
C. Court Rule-Direct application by the bar to the highest court of the state for
the adoption of such rules. This method is based on the court's inherent
power to regulate the legal profession.
As of this writing twenty-six states beginning with North Dakota in 1921,
and two territories have integrated bars. 5
2While the Canadians share with us the heritage of English laws and institutions, unlike
us they have retained the tradition and discipline of the Inns of Court.
'Winters, Integration of the Bar-You Can't Lose, 39 J. AM. JUD. Soc'v 140, 141 (1956).
'Ibid.
American Judicature Society, Citations and Bibliography of the Integrated Bar in the
United States 1 (1961). Arkansas has a limited form of bar integration for disciplinary purposes
only. See In Re Integration of the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 259 S.W. 2d 144 (1953).
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Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Florida
Idaho
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Puerto Rico
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Date
1923
1955
1933
1938
1927
1949
1923
1934
1940
1935
1930
1944
1937
1929
1925
1933
1921
1939
1935
1932
1931
1939
1931
1938
1956
1933
1945
1956
1939
Means of Integration
Statute
Statute
Statute
Const. Amendment
Statute
Court Rule
Statute
Statute & Court Rule
Statute & Court Rule
Statute & Court Rule
Statute
Court Rule
Court Rule
Statute
Statute
Statute
Statute
Court Rule
Statute
Statute
Statute
Statute & Court Rule
Statute
Statute & Court Rule
Court Rule
Statute
Statute & Court Rule
Statute & Court Rule
Statute & Court Rule
II. THE GREAT DEBATE: PRO'S AND CON'S
In 1926 the integration movement was gaining momentum. Four states had
adopted the integrated bar and many others had it under consideration. 6 At
this time the disciplinary procedures in most states were cumbersome and in-
effective. Public and formal trials were necessary; no penalties were available
short of disbarment or suspension. In practice judges often disciplined leni-
ently. During the 1920's and 1930's there were many rumors and some exposes
of unethical conduct on the part of the bench and bar. The legal profession
may have reached its lowest level in the opinion of the public. 7 In every state
8 Citations, supra note 5, at 1.
Glasser, The Debate over the Integrated Bar 2 (New York: Columbia University Bureau
of Applied Social Research, 1960).
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the topic of integration brought forth great debates and subsequent law suits.8
New York is an excellent example because of the quality of the leadership and
the bitterness of the battle. At this time in New York there was a strong move-
ment towards integration headed by Charles Evans Hughes, long an advocate
for judicial reform. Others, particularly in New York City, were deeply con-
cerned over the quantity of new lawyers as well as their professional fitness.
The rival sentiments can best be expressed by the following exchanges re-
corded at New York and Washington Bar Association meetings.
MR. HUGHES: Anybody who is admitted to the bar receives a privilege on con-
dition. I have no doubt that one of these conditions can be that he shall become
a responsible member of an organization of this sort. The state can certainly,
it seems to me, impose that condition upon his being admitted to the privilege
of practice. Bring him into this range of responsibility. Have him understand
that he is not simply amenable to discipline by some organization to which he
has no relation, but that he is a part of the bar maintaining these standards
which control his conduct.9
MR. GUTHRIE: But I am convinced that the truth is otherwise.... We cannot create
a new spirit and sentiment among these undesirable members by merely enact-
ing a program devised for that purpose and compulsorily grouping them with
us .... We, who are a voluntary body of lawyers, have been drawn together by
the fact that we are interested in all that is best and highest and noblest in our
great profession. It is because we are thus, that we are representative not so much
of the whole bar but the elite of the bar, of the best part of the bar. You will
accomplish nothing by what is called democratizing the bar, pulling down the
bar to the level of the great majority and destroying that incentive to work which
now inspires most of us in an organization of this kind.1 0
MR. HUGHES: It is said the standards of the bar are already in peril of being dis-
sipated by numbers. Instead of that being the reason to oppose organization of
the entire bar, it is a fundamental ground for urging that organization."
MR. GUTHRIE: Democracy does not require that in such organizations as the bar
and the medical profession the fit and the unfit must be admitted [to the bar as-
sociation] without distinction and without selection.' 2
Although successful in many states 8 the battle for integration was lost in
New York. This is attributed mainly to the vigorous opposition of William D.
Guthrie. Out of the New York state and other proceedings a number of pro's
8 Citations, supra note 5, at 11-24.
9 49 N.Y. ST. B. A. REP,. 91 (1926).
10 Report as President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on the Gibbs
Bill, April 1926, 49 N.Y. ST. B. A. REP. 273 (1926).
1149 N.Y. ST. B. A. REP. 91 (1926).
12 Special meeting on Bar Organization in Washington, D.C., 12 A.B.A.J. 326, 330 (1926).
"'See chart, p. 87.
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and con's have been formulated. The main arguments may be condensed as
follows:
PRO'S:
Representative organization. Every lawyer is a member. Responsibility is
squarely on the profession. Grievance procedures conducted by the bar instead
of the courts would make possible private investigations and penalties less
drastic than disbarment.
Conservation of financial resources. It would no longer be necessary to ex-
pend large sums of money and time on membership drives. Compulsory fees
give the organization a powerful weapon.
Esprit de Corps. In the tradition of the English Inns of Court the inte-
grated bar would create a professional consciousness of honor, trust and loyalty
in the entire bar. The integrated bar would create a common meeting ground
for judges and lawyers to discuss problems arising in the practice of law.
Promote judicial reform. The primary function of the integrated bar is to
advocate substantive and procedural improvements in the law and the admin-
istration of justice. The integrated bar has greater influence as it embraces the
entire legal profession. By improving the quality of the profession through im-
proved admissions and disciplinary procedures the bar would gain prestige
and respect in the eyes of the public.
CON'S:
Constitutional objections. Opponents urge that compulsory membership
would violate their guarantees under the first and fourteenth amendments.
These objections are dealt with in the treatment of the Lathrop case. (Part III,
infra)
Proof of need. Dissenters argue that the existing voluntary associations are
adequate, thus there is no need to integrate.
Political overtones. Opponents point to the natural tendency of lawyers to
introduce politics into the profession. One faction may gain control. The domi-
nant faction then would promote self-interests, binding the entire legal profes-
sion.
Control by the state government. Critics object that integration would
place the bar under the control of the state legislature and the state Supreme
Court.14
The principal objections (outside of the constitutional questions) have car-
ried very little weight. One must expect that the "undesirable" element will
tend to follow the leadership of those respected and gifted rather than reduce
the organization to the level of the unethical. It is also pointed out that the
1
, Glasser, supra note 7, at 20.
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state supreme court can always review these decisions. 15 The chief justices
of various states, with integrated bars, have stated their work load has been
reduced; that in their opinions it has been an unqualified success, and failures,
if any, have been undetected. 16 Integrationists point out that the courts and
legislatures possess regulatory powers without integration; in fact integration
will delegate more self-governmental powers to the state bar.
The above (non-constitutional) objections are considered the major prac-
tical arguments against integration. It is submitted that it is difficult to raise
valid intellectual objections to the integrated bar.
III. Lathrop v. Donohue.17 BEGINNING OR END?
The most recent judicial expression on the integrated bar may have, through
non-decision, decided the future of integration in this country. Trayton L.
Lathrop, a Wisconsin attorney, paid his 1959 dues under protest. He then
sued the treasurer of the State Bar, Joseph D. Donohue in the Circuit Court for
Fond du Lac County to recover the dues. The plaintiff alleged that the inte-
gration constituted coercion and violated his freedoms of free speech and free
association and the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. 8 The
defendant demurred on the ground, among others, that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained and the complaint dis-
missed. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed holding that the
orders integrating the State Bar did not violate the attorney's freedom of speech
or association under either the Federal or State Constitution. 19
It is significant that when the Lathrop appeal was filed the Supreme Court
of the United States set it down for oral argument immediately after the union-
shop case of International Association of Machinists v. Street,20 treated them
as companion cases and decided both at the same time.21 A thorough treatment
of the Lathrop decision requires an understanding of the Street case.
15 Note, Bar Integration Through Supreme Court Rule, 16 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 154, 155 (1933).
10 Unpublished letters from chief justices of fifteen states with integrated bars to the Chief
Justice of Wisconsin and the President of the Wisconsin Bar Association, January-March 1956.
367 U.S. 820, 81 S. Ct. 1826, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1191 (1961). Reh. denied 368 U.S. 871, 82 S. Ct. 23,
7 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1961).
19 Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wisc. 2d 230, 102 N.W. 2d 404 (1960).
'1 Id. at 406-407. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court was without
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of an order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court which
regulates the practice of law but since ithis action was one public juris in which the court
had the benefit of thorough and adequate briefs and oral arguments it would work an injustice
on the plaintiff if he was made to commence a new proceeding to relitigate the same issue. Thus
the court treated the case as if it were properly brought and decided on the merits.
"367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1961).
Since Wisconsin integrated under Statute and Court Rule and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's order integrating the state bar did not dispose of any issues between parties the United
States Supreme Court trealted the decision as an order equivalent to a statute for the purposes
of 28 U.S.C. §1257 (2) (1958). That section authorizes the Supreme Court to review on appeal
a final judgment of the highest court of a state when the validity of a state statute is at issue.
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In Street a group of employees brought a class action to restrain enforce-
ment of a unionshop agreement on the grounds that their dues were used to
support political candidates and causes they opposed. The trial court granted
an injunction. It held that §2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§152, Eleventh, violated the first amendment to the extent that it permitted
the unions to use the dues to support causes which their members opposed.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.22
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed. In a plurality opinion
written by Justice Brennan the court avoided the constitutional issues23 and
interpreted the Federal Statute as denying authority to the union, over objec-
tions, to use the money in support of causes which were so opposed.24 The
Georgia court was reversed because the union-shop agreement is in itself law-
ful and the union dues must be paid. The restraint on collection of all dues
from dissenting employees went too far since the objections centered only on
the use of a fraction of their dues. The remedy for dissenters, as stated by the
Court, would be to seek an injunction against the spending of that fraction of
their dues based upon the proportion of the union's total expenditures on po-
litical causes to its total budget; or to seek restitution of that fraction expended
for political causes to which the member objected and had so advised the
union. 25 Since the Court concluded that the employee must first state his ob-
jections to the union, a class action will not lie. Each individual must seek relief
only in respect to his dues, and then only as to a fraction of them. It is to be
noted 'that in the Street case the court had before it a record which set out in
great detail the expenditure of dues money in support of political causes.
Justice Brennan also wrote the opinion in the Lathrop case, joined by the
same plurality of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Clark and Stewart. Justice
Harlan wrote a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Frankfurter.
Justice Whittaker also wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Black and Douglas
each wrote a dissenting opinion.
Plurality Opinion:
The Court rejected the constitutional objection of freedom of association
stating, "In our view the case presents a claim of impingement upon freedom
of association no different from that which we decided in Railway Employees
International Association of Machinists et al v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E. 2d 796 (1959).
"For the theory that the Supreme Court should avoid constitutional issues whenever pos-
sible, see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 588, 80 L. Ed. 1011
(1936); Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S. Ct. 624, 95 L. Ed. 817
(1951).
21 The constitutionality of the union-shop agreement had been upheld by a unamious Court
in an earlier case. Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed.
1112 (1956).
281 S. Ct. at 1803.
1962]
Catholic University Law Review
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225."126 The Court then relied on the analogy drawn
by Justice Douglas in the Hanson case that, "On the present record, there is
no more an infringement or impairment of first amendment rights than there
would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of
an integrated bar."27 On the record presented Justice Brennan could not find
any abridgement of the appellant's freedom of association.
We think that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in order to further the State's
legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional services, may consti-
tutionally require that the costs of improving the profession in this fashion
should be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program, the
lawyers, even though the organization created to attain the objective also engages
in some legislative activity. Given the character of the integrated bar shown on
this record, in the light of the membership requirement to the compulsory pay-
ment of reasonable dues, we are unable to find any impingement upon protected
rights of association.28
The Court refused to consider the appellant's other contention, that freedom
of speech is violated when the dues are used to support causes he opposes. The
Court felt that the record was insufficient to support this contention not that
the contention was, in itself, invalid. "Nowhere are we clearly appraised as to
the views of the appellant on any particular legislative issues on which the
State Bar has taken a position, or as to the way in which and the degree to
which funds compulsorily exacted from its members are used to support the
organization's political activities." 20 The plurality went to to reemphasize
that they were reserving the issue of the constitutionality of compelling the
appellant to contribute to causes he opposes.
Concurring Opinions:
Justice Whittaker seeing no constitutional question, concurred in a one sen-
tence opinion which is a carbon copy of Charles Evans Hughes' statement
(supra p. 8) during the 1926 debates in New York. The practice of law is a
privilege upon condition, one of the conditions being the payment of an an-
nual fee.80
In the other concurring opinion Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frank-
furter, believing that "the Constitutional issue is inescapably before us" voted
to affirm the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a state can, with-
out violating the Federal Constitution, compel a lawyer to join and use part
MId. at 1837.
MId. at 1838.
I3ld. at 1838 citing 351 U. S. 225, 235.
DId. at 1839.
30Id. at 1849.
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of his dues to support causes to which he objects.31 They objected to the sepa-
ration of the liberties of "freedom of speech" and "freedom of association" in
the consideration of the case as "a refinement that is too subtle to grasp." Jus-
tice Harlan then dealt with the constitutional issue of "free speech" which he
felt the plurality, in effect, had affirmed as a valid objection upon a complete
record. He then discussed and rejected each of the arguments the appellant
raised on the free speech issue. In answer to the claim that the dissenting law-
yer is being forced to support causes he objects to, Justice Harlan stated:
It seems to me these arguments have little force. In the first place, their sup-
position is that the voice of the dissenter is less effective if he speaks it first in an
attempt to influence the action of a democratically organized group and then,
if necessary, in dissent to the recommendations of that group. This is not at all
convincing. The dissenter is not being made to contribute funds to the further-
ance of views he opposes but is rather being made to contribute funds to a group
expenditure about which he will have something to say.32
Recognizing, along with the plurality, the supervisory powers of the state,
with the courts, in regulating the practice of law Justice Harlan closed stating:
I end as I began. It is exceedingly regrettable that such specious contentions as
appellant makes in this case should have resulted in putting the Integrated
Bar under this cloud of partial unconstitutionality. 33
Dissenting Opinions:
There were two dissenting opinions, one by Justice Black and the other by
Justice Douglas. Justice Black decided that there is a constitutional issue be-
fore the Court and that the first amendment right of free speech is abridged
when funds are used to support causes, candidates or ideologies the attorney
opposes. He would, under the decision in the Street case, reverse and direct the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to refund the dues exacted and used to support
measures the appellant objects to.3 4 Justice Douglas goes one step further,
arguing that the integrated bar is unconstitutional per se. He believes that
abridgement of the right of free association should be allowed only in excep-
tional circumstances and that Hanson should be "closely confined." 35 Justice
Douglas also rejected the analogy of the union-shop and the integrated bar
that he made, writing for a unanimous Court, in the Hanson case. The result of
approving even the partial regimentation of professional people would, he
states,
8mId. at 1841.
8MId. at 1845.
'Id. at 1849.
Ild. at 1856.
RId. at 1859.
1962]
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[p]ractically give carte blanche to any legislature to put at least professional
people into goose-stepping brigades. Those brigades are not compatible with
the First Amendment.36
Conclusion:
The conclusion is inescapable that with this "cloud of partial unconstitution-
ality" hanging over its head the integrated bar cannot work as an effective ad-
vocate of legislative and judicial reform. It is generally agreed that these are
among its most important functions. If it has to stand the constant test of judi-
cial review, then its effectiveness will be meager. The integrated bar will be-
come a powerless force bound by the outcry of each dissident member. All of
the arguments used in support of the integrated bar (Part II, supra) will fail.
Viewing the Lathrop decision one's first reaction might be to hail it as the
removal of the last obstacle in the way of integration. However, as this writer
has indicated, it must be read in the light of its companion case, International
Association of Machinists v. Street. Analyzing both cases the following deduc-
tions are made:
1. Integration, in itself, is constitutional. The decision of a unanimous Court
in Hanson and the Court's opinion in both the Lathrop and Street cases
support this contention. Only Justice Douglas limits Hanson to its facts.
2. The Street case has established that a dissident member can seek restitution
for the proportionate amount spent on causes he opposes provided he pre-
sents an adequate record of the expenditures and proof of prior objection.
There is no reason to believe that the plurality would not apply the same
reasoning to a proper case under the integrated bar.
3. As pointed out by Justice Harlan in the Lathrop case, there is a strong in-
dication that the plurality has, in effect, decided that a proper case would
be held to violate "free speech". Justice Black and Justice Douglas have
consistently held that this is so. There is a strong probability that the plu-
rality would join the latter two and strike down the use of funds in any
case in which the record is adequate. This statement is supported by their
express "reservation" of this issue in the Lathrop case.37 Only Justices
Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker have held that the "free speech" issue
is without merit.
4. If the statement in the Street case that a class action will not lie is upheld,
each objecting member will have to seek his own relief. Admittedly, this
will present a formidable obstacle to many suits but this does not mean that
the courts will not be flooded with "strike" suits. An integrated bar subject
w Ibid.
37Id. at 1840.
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to the threat of such suits will, in reality, be a voluntary association and
no more.
The optimism expressed by the American Judicature Society and others
after the Lathrop decision is premature.38 As of this writing the only estab-
lished fact is that integration, in itself, is constitutional. It is regrettable that
our profession can be so conscious of the need for reforms and unable to accept
the best tool-the integrated bar.
Perhaps the answer lies in this statement written during the first skirmishes
over integration:
The Incorporated bar will come when the profession is ready for it, when it has,
if it ever can, raised itself by its bootstraps.3 9
HENRY E. FORGIONE II
Citations, supra note 5, at 1.
8 Wickser, Bar Associations, 15 CORN. L.Q. 390, 408 (1930).
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